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Mind and Body - Descartes
In his fourth meditation - "Of Truth and Error", Descartes follows his reasoning of the existence of God, and the notion of perfection, and applies it to his contemplation’s regarding error, or the error in the minds eye. He follows the reasoning, that if God has implanted the notion of perfection in the perception of things, and objective feelings, then how could we possibly be deceived at all. Why would we doubt anything at all?
2. For, in the first place, I discover that it is impossible for him ever to deceive me, for in all fraud and deceit there is a certain imperfection: and although it may seem that the ability to deceive is a mark of subtlety or power, yet the will testifies without doubt of malice and weakness; and such, accordingly, cannot be found in God.
3. In the next place, I am conscious that I possess a certain faculty of judging or discerning truth from error, which I doubtless received from God, along with whatever else is mine; and since it is impossible that he should will to deceive me, it is likewise certain that he has not given me a faculty that will ever lead me into error, provided I use it aright.
Certainly in an ideal world, doubt would not serve any purpose whatsoever. His reasoning leads him to conclude that it is freewill and judgment that is the cause of error.
12. But if I abstain from judging of a thing when I do not conceive it with sufficient clearness and distinctness, it is plain that I act rightly, and am not deceived; but if I resolve to deny or affirm, I then do not make a right use of my free will; and if I affirm what is false, it is evident that I am deceived; moreover, even although I judge according to truth, I stumble upon it by chance, and do not therefore escape the imputation of a wrong use of my freedom; for it is a dictate of the natural light, that the knowledge of the understanding ought always to precede the determination of the will. And it is this wrong use of the freedom of the will in which is found the privation that constitutes the form of error. Privation, I say, is found in the act, in so far as it proceeds from myself, but it does not exist in the faculty which I received from God, nor even in the act, in so far as it depends on him.
16. I have even good reason to remain satisfied on the ground that, if he has not given me the perfection of being superior to error by the first means I have pointed out above, which depends on a clear and evident knowledge of all the matters regarding which I can deliberate, he has at least left in my power the other means, which is, firmly to retain the resolution never to judge where the truth is not clearly known to me: for, although I am conscious of the weakness of not being able to keep my mind continually fixed on the same thought, I can nevertheless, by attentive and oft-repeated meditation, impress it so strongly on my memory that I shall never fail to recollect it as often as I require it, and I can acquire in this way the habitude of not erring.
These thoughts may not be new either, since many ethical views and religious beliefs agree in the rejection of unfounded judgment, a cause of error. His point regarding error in judgment, being the consequence of freewill, is interesting. Since it is important to note that without freedom of choice there can be no judgment, or evaluation. In fact, without freewill, there can be, perhaps, no ego at all?
"Of The Existence Of Material Things, And Of The Real Distinction Between The Mind And Body Of Man"
In his final meditation, Descartes examines again more closely, the realisation of the corporeal, [material world], and attempts to distinguish the difference between the rational ideas of the mind, and the imagination. After satisfying himself that he has proved beyond doubt, the existence of God, it therefore only remains he should once again, re-examine his doubts of all else outside of his own mind.
1. THERE now only remains the inquiry as to whether material things exist. With regard to this question, I at least know with certainty that such things may exist, in as far as they constitute the object of the pure mathematics, since, regarding them in this aspect, I can conceive them clearly and distinctly.
3. I remark, besides, that this power of imagination which I possess, in as far as it differs from the power of conceiving, is in no way necessary to my nature or essence, that is, to the essence of my mind; for although I did not possess it, I should still remain the same that I now am, from which it seems we may conclude that it depends on something different from the mind.
4. But I am accustomed to imagine many other objects besides that corporeal nature which is the object of the pure mathematics, as, for example, colors, sounds, tastes, pain, and the like, although with less distinctness; and, inasmuch as I perceive these objects much better by the senses, through the medium of which and of memory, they seem to have reached the imagination, I believe that, in order the more advantageously to examine them, it is proper I should at the same time examine what sense-perception is, and inquire whether from those ideas that are apprehended by this mode of thinking ( consciousness), I cannot obtain a certain proof of the existence of corporeal objects.
He begins by summarising his former discussions regarding his doubt in his senses and thus, the material world about him, and how, by God’s grace he is able to perceive of ideas and bodies external to his own mind. From his first analysis, he still appears to hold to the precept that, regardless of an extended body, and senses, he is still merely a "thinking thing".
And although I may, or rather, as I will shortly say, although I certainly do possess a body with which I am very closely conjoined; nevertheless, because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in as far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct idea of body, in as far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing, it is certain that I, that is, my mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely and truly distinct from my body, and may exist without it.
Further, I cannot doubt but that there is in me a certain passive faculty of perception, that is, of receiving and taking knowledge of the ideas of sensible things; but this would be useless to me, if there did not also exist in me, or in some other thing, another active faculty capable of forming and producing those ideas. But this active faculty cannot be in me in as far as I am but a thinking thing, seeing that it does not presuppose thought, and also that those ideas are frequently produced in my mind without my contributing to it in any way, and even frequently contrary to my will.
Now he appears to change his first opinions, in his doubts of the extended world, to that of acceptance, that he could not, at all, be responsible for the invention of such ideas, [from imagination alone]. And that, by the grace of God, there must be truth in corporeal things.
This faculty must therefore exist in some substance different from me, in which all the objective reality of the ideas that are produced by this faculty is contained formally or eminently, as I before remarked; and this substance is either a body, that is to say, a corporeal nature in which is contained formally and in effect all that is objectively and by representation in those ideas; or it is God himself...
For as he has given me no faculty whereby I can discover this to be the case, but, on the contrary, a very strong inclination to believe that those ideas arise from corporeal objects, I do not see how he could be vindicated from the charge of deceit, if in truth they proceeded from any other source, or were produced by other causes than corporeal things: and accordingly it must be concluded, that corporeal objects exist. Nevertheless, they are not perhaps exactly such as we perceive by the senses, for their comprehension by the senses is, in many instances, very obscure and confused; but it is at least necessary to admit that all which I clearly and distinctly conceive as in them, that is, generally speaking all that is comprehended in the object of speculative geometry, really exists external to me.
Descartes concludes by uniting the body and the mind once more. He appears to have travelled full circle in his reasoning for separation of these, but finally admits to their co-operation and unity of purpose. He still is no clearer, in defining the point of separation of the mind with the body, and therefore accepts the reliance on their interactions to comprehend the world around him, [although he does not dispute the errors and confusions inherent within this co-operation].
24. And certainly this consideration is of great service, not only in enabling me to recognize the errors to which my nature is liable, but likewise in rendering it more easy to avoid or correct them: for, knowing that all my senses more usually indicate to me what is true than what is false, in matters relating to the advantage of the body, and being able almost always to make use of more than a single sense in examining the same object, and besides this, being able to use my memory in connecting present with past knowledge, and my understanding which has already discovered all the causes of my errors, I ought no longer to fear that falsity may be met with in what is daily presented to me by the senses.
So is there anything to be taken from Descartes’ reasoning? He appears to have shown a logical grounding for the existence of God, not merely through a simple conjecture of first cause and effect, but by a careful analysis of the origins of ideas, and the notion of perfection beyond any natural evidence. He has shown, that the use of freewill and judgment can be the cause of misconceptions and error, and thus, should be avoided.
Although he appears to have finally convinced himself of the reality of the extended, corporeal world, his first assumptions and scepticism is still intriguing. We may still contemplate for ourselves, his thoughts and conclusions regarding the mind - "Where is the mind?" and thus "where am I?" [within my mind]. And finally, the most important question of all, "who am I?"
Descartes, whilst attempting to explore the questions and relationships concerned with the mind and body, had certainly opened the proverbial ‘can of worms’. His conclusions, or rather lack of them, has been the bone of contention for philosophers past and present, and his separation of the phenomena of mind and matter has resulted in two of the most important and fundamental philosophical camps - idealism and materialism.
"Meditations on First Philosophy"
Translated by John Veitch (1901)
